Efficient values from Game Theory are used, in order to find out a fair allocation for a scheduling game associated with the problem of scheduling jobs with a common due date. A four person game illustrates the basic ideas and the computational difficulties.
 Any deviation from the due date will be penalized, either an early or a late completion relative to the due date. The total time deviation in a schedule  is given by     .
(1)
The usual scheduling problem is to: find out the schedule  for which the total deviation is minimal.
In [1] , J. J. Kanet solved the problem for the case when the sum of completion times is smaller than, or equal to and gave an algorithm for computing a schedule with a minimal deviation. Of course, this algorithm may be used to find the total penalty for this schedule and also to find the total penalty for any minimal deviation corresponding to any subset of jobs. This makes sense in the case when the costs of the deviations, early or late, are proportional to their size. In the following, we assume that the costs are equal to the penalties. A more general case other than Kanet's has been solved by M. U. Ahmed and P. S. Sundararaghavan in [2] . In [3] , N. G. Hall and M. E. Posner consider similar problems. The literature connected to more general cases is huge, and the conclusions obtained in the present paper can be applied to most other cases. For the present discussion, the simplest case offered by Kanet's algorithm, with the above assumptions, is good enough to suggest similar approaches in all other cases, in connection with a new problem to be introduced below.
Assuming that the grand coalition has been formed and the total penalty for early and late deviation,  , w N has been computed by some algorithm, a new problem is: how much should be a fair individual penalty for each job?
To answer the question, we now build the following cooperative game with transferable utilities: let
be the set of players, the player be J for each the customer ordering the job 1, 2, , then choose the non-selected job in with a maximal processing time and take it as the first job in S A (that is starting at ). Repeat the procedure, selecting alternatively players in S then in
is exhausted; then, the time deviation is computed by formula (1) for the corresponding schedule and in the same way for any subset of players.
be a set of jobs to be processed on a single machine, with the processing times and the due date is 1 2 12, 10, p p p   39, 3 4 such that the Kanet's condition shown above holds. We can compute for the set of players
, and its subsets, the total penalties. Kanet's algorithm will generate the game Looking at the characteristic values of our game, shown in example 1, we see that the players 1 and 2 seem to be equal, while players 3 and 4 are weaker, hence the last two should be asked to pay smaller individual penalties.
The first solution does not seem to show this, while the second seems more fair, we shall see a method below to compare the fairness of the solutions. 
Individual Penalties
To evaluate the fairness of a possible solution we may use the excess functions; however, here it seems more appropriate to use some similar functions that we shall call the "cost excess" functions. For any coalition and any allocation the cost excess function is
These are the negatives of usual excess functions, obviously, we have 2 2 n  such functions, because for the grand coalition, for any allocation, by definition we have
In words, the cost excess is the difference  between what the coalition will pay in to contribute as close as possible to the total penalty for herself, while it is also contributing to the total penalty for Then, what we want to do is to choose the allocation which minimizes all cost excesses on the set of allocations. Note that the sum of all cost excesses is a constant, because for any allocation we have
Moreover, we can define the average cost excess
which by formula (4) does not depend on the allocation This means that if the allocation of some coalition is increased, then the allocation of at least one other coalition will be decreased. How the cost excesses are used to compare the fairness of two allocations is illustrated below. Our problem is to minimize all cost excesses, while we are on the set of allocations, that is the efficiency condition holds. In other words, we want to minimize the maximal cost excess, subject to efficiency condition, or to use another method to solve a multi objective linear programming problem.
Let us try to evaluate the fairness of the two allocations offered until now.
For the Egalitarian solution, we can compute the cost excesses and put them in a vector of non increasing excesses, which may be called the vector of unhappiness, as the components are taken in the order of non increasing unhappiness     that is the most unhappy coalition in * x is more unhappy than the most unhappy coalition in
We can say that is better than *. y *. y *, x or more fair. Note that the same thing could be said if some pairs of corresponding components in the two unhappiness vectors are equal, but the first one which is different is smaller in
In this case, we also write
where means the lexicographic L order, and read is better than * y *. x Until now, we have seen two simple solutions belonging to Game Theory, they are one point solutions because each one is providing a unique solution.
One of the set solutions from Game Theory is the CORE, which for a cost game like ours is the
Any element of the CORE is considered as a good allocation, because such an allocation covers the total penalty for each coalition. Looking at the two simple solutions of example 1, which as seen in example 2 have all excesses non negative, we see that both are in the CORE, but, of course, there are others with the same property. Moreover, we can also see that the sum of excesses equals 96, that is the worth obtained in formula (4) for 
The most famous one point solution, which may also be in the CORE, is the Shapley Value, introduced in [4] , and defined by a set of axioms, describing some basic properties required for a fair solution. The Shapley Value was proved there to be given by the formula
Example 3: For the game considered in example 1, we get
Computing the cost excesses and ordering them, we obtain     8, 8, 8, 8, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 6, 6, 5, 5 . SH
because the first components of the unhappiness vectors are in this order, hence the Shapley Value is better than the Egalitarian non separable contribution, which is better than the Egalitarian solution. Note that this may not be the case for other games. Note also that if the game is large, then the Shapley Value may not be easy to compute. An algorithm based upon the so called Average per capita formula, given by the author in [5] , may be used, as it will be explained in the next section and the algorithm is allowing even a parallel computation of the Shapley Value. Similar situations may occur in connection with the other values.
The Cost Least Square Prenucleolus
In the following, we may consider as a solution the Least Square Prenucleolus of the game, introduced by L. Ruiz, F. Valenciano and J. Zarzuelo in [6] . This is similar to the Prenucleolus, introduced in connection with the Nucleolus, due to D. Schmeidler [7] , except that this was defined by means of the following quadratic programming problem
By using the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, in (8), (9) , it has been shown that our problem has a unique solution, that the authors called the Least Square Prenucleolus, namely to other scheduling problems in which the associated scheduling game can still be generated by some algorithm. Some of the following remarks may help:
where
As the cost excesses are replacing the excesses, we called this value the Cost Least Square Prenucleolus, but the expressions (10) and (11) are the same even in our case.
Example 4: Computing by (10) and (11) 
The vector of unhappiness is (see foot-note). Notice that the sum of cost excesses is also 96. Now, checking the comparison of the new solution with the other three solutions, we obtain     , , SH N w LS N w  that is the Shapley Value seems to be more fair than the other three values. Of course, the Schmeidler's Prenucleolus may also be computed; the computational method, due to A. Kopelowitz [8] , is also shown in [9] . However, this includes a long computation for solving a sequence of linear optimization problems. The Prenucleolus would be the best, by the definition of the value.
Another principle may be used to choose the appropriate allocation: for each allocation available, compute the difference between the cost for the most unhappy coalition and the happiest coalition and choose the allocation that gives the smallest difference. Such an allocation would not give a high difference of costs between the happy and the unhappy coalitions. In our case, we have
